The Creative Aspect of Language Use (CALU)

Source: Mark C. Baker, “The Creative Aspect of Language Use,” Chapter 3 in The Soul Hypothesis: Investigations into the Existence of the Soul (eds. Mark C. Baker & Stewart Goetz, 2010).


1. The Three Components of the Language Faculty

Noam Chomsky distinguished three fundamental components of the human language faculty:

  1. The Lexicon: The mental repository or list of words.
  2. The Grammar: The computational system and recursive rules for combining words.
  3. The Creative Aspect of Language Use (CALU): The capacity to mobilize linguistic resources (vocabulary and syntax) to produce and interpret expressions.

The Three Signature Properties of CALU

Chomsky defines the CALU as the human ability to generate language that simultaneously exhibits three properties:

  • Unbounded: Not restricted to a finite repertoire of formulas or canned sentences; capable of producing an infinite variety of novel expressions as circumstances demand.
  • Stimulus-Free: Not reflexively determined by internal physiological states or external environmental stimuli, yet not random or chaotic.
  • Appropriate to Situations: Apt, coherent, and intelligible—speaking “so as appositely to reply to what is said” and enabling listeners to recognize the speaker’s thoughts and communicative intent.

2. The Cartesian Connection

Descartes argued that behavior simultaneously unbounded, stimulus-free, and situationally appropriate cannot be explained by mechanical physics—taking it as primary evidence for an immaterial mind rather than an automaton. Chomsky similarly noted that while recursive grammar can be formalized mathematically, the creative use of language remains an unexplained mystery beyond mechanical algorithms.


3. Psycholinguistic Models: Levelt’s Conceptualizer

Willem Levelt’s speech production model distinguishes three processors, identifying CALU with the initial stage:

  1. The Conceptualizer: Translates non-linguistic intentions into preverbal messages. It embodies CALU by generating messages that are novel, stimulus-free, and contextually appropriate.
  2. The Formulator: Accesses the lexicon and grammatical rules to map preverbal messages into phonological and syntactic “inner speech.”
  3. The Articulator: Executes the motor commands for overt vocal expression.

Empirical Evidence: The Ehrich Room-Description Experiment

In an experiment cited by Levelt, participants were asked to describe furniture in a simple room. Even under identical stimuli and strict task constraints, their descriptions varied endlessly in phrasing and perspective—demonstrating that output is unbounded and uncoerced by stimuli, yet fully cooperative and appropriate.


4. Is CALU General Free Will or a Dedicated Mental Faculty?

This raises a foundational question in the philosophy of mind:

Is CALU simply our general capacity for free will applied to acts of speaking, or is it a distinct, specialized component of the human mind?

The Thought Experiment: A CALU-Specific Aphasia

What would a clinical syndrome resulting from direct neurological damage to CALU look like?

  • Intact Lexicon: The patient could name objects, define terms, and recognize words without impairment.
  • Intact Grammar and Articulation: When repeating sentences, singing memorized lyrics, or reciting fixed texts (e.g., the Lord’s Prayer), their speech would be completely fluent and grammatically flawless.
  • Deficit in CALU: The patient would fail to generate spontaneous, purposeful sentences, or would combine words in an arbitrary, incoherent manner disconnected from context.

While each of these symptoms can occur in isolation across various neuropsychological conditions, this specific profile does not cluster together as an identifiable aphasic syndrome. Neurological injury typically impairs vocabulary access or grammatical processing, while the capacity for intentional, appropriate expression remains resilient.


5. Philosophical Implication: The Soul Hypothesis

This dissociation suggests an asymmetry in human cognitive architecture:

  • Hardware-Dependent Components: Algorithmic and mechanical sub-systems (such as grammatical parsing, lexical lookup, and motor articulation) appear to depend heavily on specific, localized brain structures.
  • Agency-Dependent Components: Higher-level creative intentionality and free application (CALU) may depend less directly on localized neural machinery.

Under The Soul Hypothesis, this pattern supports the view that the human mind cannot be reduced entirely to physical neurobiology, fitting the observed clinical and psychological data as well as or better than strictly materialist alternatives.