What Am I? Personal Identity and the Unity of Consciousness

Source: Dean Zimmerman, “What Am I?”, Chapter 7 in The Soul Hypothesis: Investigations into the Existence of the Soul (eds. Mark C. Baker & Stewart Goetz, 2010).


1. The Unity of Consciousness

When asking “What am I?” in an ontological sense, we start with the unity of consciousness: whatever asks this question is a single subject capable of experiencing a simultaneous plurality of sensations (sight, sound, touch, thought).

  • No Division of Psychological Labor: A single conscious subject cannot compare a sound with a color by delegating hearing to one part and seeing to another.
  • Brentano’s Principle: As Franz Brentano famously argued, claiming two separate parts combine to recognize a multi-modal relationship is like claiming that a blind person and a deaf person together could compare colors with sounds. A unified comparison demands a single, indivisible subject.

2. Limits of Introspection and the Semantics of “I”

Weak Ontic Ignorance

Introspection alone cannot settle whether we are material or immaterial:

  • Bodily sensations feel physical, yet phantom limbs prove that feeling a bodily part does not entail actually having that part.
  • Out-of-body experiences or drug states feel non-physical, yet may be sensory illusions.
  • As philosopher George Graham noted, weak ontic ignorance holds: the intrinsic metaphysical nature of the self is simply not directly accessible via introspection.

The Semantics of “I” (Nagel & Kripke)

Thomas Nagel compares the indexical “I” to natural kind terms like “gold”:

  • A speaker can accurately identify and refer to “gold” using superficial traits without knowing its atomic number or chemical essence; the term leaves an open space to be filled in by empirical and metaphysical discovery.
  • Similarly, “I” refers to whatever single entity is currently thinking these thoughts. The meaning of “I” does not reveal a priori whether the referent is a biological brain, an immaterial soul, or something else.

3. Garden-Variety Materialism & The Problem of Vagueness

Materialists typically identify the self with familiar physical structures (“garden-variety material objects”)—primarily the whole living organism, the central nervous system, the brain, the cerebrum, or a single cerebral hemisphere.

However, all biological candidates face the Problem of Vagueness (The Cloud Problem):

  • Fuzzy Boundaries: Living organs and organisms lack precise micro-physical borders. Because participation in metabolic processes is a matter of degree, there is no absolute answer to which borderline atoms or molecules belong to a brain at any given millisecond.
  • The “Many Thinkers” Dilemma: If the thinker is a vague, cloud-like biological entity, then there exist thousands of overlapping, equally qualified physical candidates (collections of atoms differing by a single molecule) at the exact same location. This creates the absurd conclusion that either thousands of thinkers exist in your chair, or that the identity of the thinker is indeterminate.

4. The Spectrum of Dualisms

Dualist theories avoid the vagueness dilemma by positing a unified, non-composite subject of experience. Viable dualist positions agree that souls are concrete particulars that exist in time and undergo change, but differ in their relationship to physical space and brain activity:

ModelNature of the SelfSpatial StatusGeneration & Brain Relation
Garden-Variety MaterialismBrain / OrganismLocated in space; vague boundaries (cloud-like).Physical metabolism; subject to the “many thinkers” problem.
Cartesian DualismSimple (partless) immaterial substanceNon-spatial (no position in physical space).Independent substance; interacts with matter via unknown interface.
Emergent Dualism (e.g., William Hasker)Simple immaterial subjectLocated in space (co-located with the brain).Naturally generated by sufficiently complex neural configurations; eases interaction problems.

Core Takeaway

Materialism cannot be established a priori simply by analyzing the concept of “I” or through bodily introspection. Because physical candidates are plagued by fuzzy boundaries and the problem of the many thinkers, positing a simple, unified subject (whether Cartesian or emergent) remains a serious metaphysical contender for explaining the unity of consciousness.